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Damian Caluori

Divine Practical Thought in Plotinus

Plotinus follows the Timaeus and the Platonist tradition before him in
postulating the existence of a World Soul1. Just like any other individual soul, the
World Soul has to care for a particular body, namely, in this case, the sensible
world as a whole. Since the sensible world, according to Plotinus, is organized
rationally and since the World Soul is crucially in charge of caring for it, there
is a question concerning the sort of thinking that is involved in the World Soul’s
caring for the sensible world. I will take for granted (for the purposes of this
paper) that Plotinus’ World Soul is engaged in the contemplation of the world of
Forms and that this is necessary for its taking care of its body. After all, in order
to know what the sensible world must look like, the World Soul has to know the
paradigm whose excellent image the sensible world is. I will argue, however,
that according to Plotinus the contemplation of Forms is not sufficient for the
creation and maintenance of the sensible world. Rather, he postulates in addition
another kind of thinking, practical thinking, which is necessary for the creation
and maintenance of the sensible world too. I will further argue that this thinking
is timeless. My focus will be on Ennead IV 4, 9-12.
1. The ruling principle of the sensible world
In the context of these chapters Plotinus discusses the question of what class
of living beings possess memory and in particular whether divine beings belong to
this class. Memory, Plotinus insists at Ennead IV 4, 7, presupposes a change in the
person’s mind such that the person’s awareness is no longer directed at the object
she has memory of (or, more precisely, it presupposes that the awareness is not
always directed at its object so that there is at least one moment in time at which
it is not directed towards it). A being that is in a state of eternal contemplation
(and whose awareness is eternally directed at the object of this contemplation),
for example, will have no memory of the object of her contemplation. Asking
whether the souls of the stars, who are, according to Plotinus, divine beings (beings
eternally engaged in the contemplation of God) remember God, Plotinus answers :

1
I would like to thank Eyfi Emilsson, Peter Turner and an anonymous reader for their very helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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« Well, they always see him. As long as they see him, it is impossible for them to
say that they have seen him. For this happens to those who have ceased to see
him » (Enn. IV 4, 7, 1-3)2. Thus, it is impossible for divine beings to say anything
implying that their seeing God occurred in the past. Since the quoted passage is
supposed to be an argument for the claim that the stars do not remember God,
we can conclude that memory is of things that specifically occur in the past — a
claim that we can also find in Aristotle3. Plotinus already anticipated this result
at Enn. IV 3, 25, where he states that we ought not to attribute memory to God
because there is « no earlier and later » and there is no change in the intelligible
realm4. If the mental activity someone is engaged in is unchangingly the very same
forever then this person cannot distinguish — as far as this unchanging mental
activity is concerned — past, present and future. Thus, as far as this unchanging
mental activity is concerned, there can be no mental activity that is specifically
about or directed towards its past (nor specifically about its present nor specifically
about its future). There are no temporal distinctions to be made in unchanging
mental activities as such5. I will come back to this below. For now let us simply
note that it is in this context that Plotinus asks whether the ruling principle (to
hêgemonoun) of the sensible world possesses memory.
What is this ruling principle ? At Enn. IV 4, 9, 1-6 Plotinus refers to Phaedrus,
246E4-5 where Zeus is said to give order to the sensible world and to care for
everything, being the great leader in heaven. Plotinus combines this reference
with one to Philebus, 30D1-2 where Socrates attributes to Zeus a royal soul and
a royal intellect (nous). Thus, Zeus, possessing an intellect and a soul, orders the
sensible world and cares for it. In the following chapter, Enn. IV 4, 10, Plotinus
claims that what orders (to kosmoun) the sensible world is twofold : on the one
hand it is the Timaean Craftsman and on the other the World Soul. Furthermore,
Plotinus explains that he sometimes uses the name ‘Zeus’ to refer to the Craftsman
and sometimes to the ruling principle (to hêgemonoun) of the All. Clearly, the
ruling principle, being thus distinct from the Craftsman, will be one of the two
entities that order the sensible world whose ruling principle it is. We can thus

2
Note that Plotinus here uses the perfect of the verb ‘seeing’ (« they have seen him ») as a tense
and not as an aspect : the perfect here indicates the past.
3
Aristotle, De memoria, 449b9-30.
4
In the same chapter, Plotinus urges us not confuse memory with something else that is sometimes
called ‘memory’, namely Platonic recollection. The argument I am presenting in the case of memory
can easily be adapted to the case of Platonic recollection.
5
By ‘temporal distinctions’ I mean distinctions between A-properties in the sense of McTaggart’s
A-theories of time. For A-theories, the distinction between past, present and future is fundamental.
See J. M. E. McTaggart, The Unreality of Time, « Mind », 17, 1908, pp. 457-474.
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conclude that the ruling principle of the All is the World Soul6. Moreover, when
Plotinus earlier referred to Zeus by quoting the Phaedrus and the Philebus, he
will have meant by ‘Zeus’ the Craftsman (assuming that the World Soul does not
possess a soul)7.
Plotinus immediately sets aside the Craftsman to focus on a discussion of
the World Soul. For, he claims, « as far as the Craftsman is concerned, we must
completely eliminate ‘earlier and later’ (to prosô kai opisô) by attributing to him
a single unchangeable (atrepton) and timeless (achronon) life » (Enn. IV 4, 10,
4-6)8. Since the life of the Craftsman is unchangeable and timeless, we cannot
make temporal distinctions (in the sense specified) in it. Thus, there is nothing
in the Craftsman’s life that specifically occurs in the past. For this reason, there
is no need to discuss further whether the Craftsman possesses memory : he
does not. For, as I argued above, memory is specifically about the past and thus
presupposes distinguishing between past and non-past. Accordingly, Plotinus can
rule out that the World Soul possesses memory if he can show that the World
Soul is only engaged in mental activities that are unchanging9. If all of the World
Soul’s mental activities are such that, as far as they are concerned, we cannot
distinguish between past and non-past, then the World Soul will not have memory.
Now it is clear that the World Soul is engaged in activities that involve change.
After all, there are many changes in the sensible world — indeed, the sensible
world is crucially undergoing change all the time. And, in some way or other,
the World Soul, being the ruling principle of the sensible world, is in charge of
these changes and brings them about. Must we attribute memory to the World
Soul because it brings about change in its body ?
If I have dinner and later remember that I had dinner then having had dinner
is certainly necessary for my remembering it (otherwise, I would only seem to
remember, being subject to an illusion or a mistake). However, it is not sufficient

Plato uses the expression ‘ruling principle’ at Ti., 41C to refer to the highest and immortal of
the three forms of individual soul he distinguishes there : the rational soul. For example, the ruling
principle of Socrates will be his rational soul (as opposed to the two non-rational forms of soul Plato
distinguishes in the Timaeus). The Stoics also emphasize the ruling function of the soul by calling
the rational soul hêgêmonikon.
7
Given that Plotinus distinguishes between hypostasis Soul and World Soul, it is tempting to
identify the royal soul of the Craftsman with the hypostasis Soul and his royal intellect with the
hypostasis Intellect. I will not argue for this here, however, and nothing in what follows hinges on it.
I argue for it in D. Caluori, Plotinus on the Soul, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2015, ch. 1.
8
Compare this to Enn. IV 3, 25 briefly referred to above.
9
Even a weaker claim will do if we assume that awareness is necessary for having memory : that
all mental activities of which the World Soul is ever aware, must be unchanging. But, of course, if
the stronger claim holds true (that there is no unchanging mental activity in the World Soul), the
weaker one will hold true too.
6
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for my remembering it. It is possible to do things without recalling them or, what
is more : without even forming a memory of them. In The Nature of Mind David
Armstrong discusses the case of a long-distance truck driver :
« After driving for long periods of time, particularly at night, it is possible to ‘come
to’ and realize that for some time past one has been driving without being aware
of what one has been doing. The coming-to is an alarming experience. It is natural
to describe what went on before one came to by saying that during that time one
lacked consciousness »10.

Armstrong goes on to explain that, in this case, in one sense the truck driver
did not lack consciousness, namely in the sense that the driver saw the road,
other cars etc. Armstrong calls this perceptual consciousness. In another sense of
‘consciousness’, however, he did lack consciousness, namely in the sense that he
was not aware of his driving, of his seeing the road etc. Thus, the truck driver saw
the road (other cars etc.) without being aware of it. At Enn. IV 8, 8, 7-9 Plotinus
makes a similar observation : « For we do not realize everything that happens in a
part of the soul before it comes to the whole soul »11. Now it seems plausible that
one only forms memories of things of which one is aware. The truck driver will
not remember the last stretch he drove when he ‘comes to’. This is why coming
to is, in Armstrong’s phrase, « an alarming experience ». However, even if one
denies this and assumes that we can form memories of things that we did not
consciously experience, these considerations certainly show that if I do not even
perceive what I am doing, then I will not be able to remember it. (Here ‘perception’
must be understood to cover not only the kinds for which we use the five sense
but also perception of states internal to the body and proprioception). This is
because I will not have been able to form any memory of it. If the World Soul
never mentally grasps the changes it brings about (nor, for that matter, any other
changes that may occur externally to it) then it will never remember them and
thus there will be no need to attribute memory to the World Soul on the basis of
the claim that it rules the ever-changing sensible world.
So Plotinus’ task is twofold : (i) he has to show that the World Soul does not
obtain any mental content from the sensible world. (ii) He has to show that the
internal cognitive activity of the World Soul, even the cognitive activity whose
intentional object is a sensible world, is unchanging. In other words : (i) the
World Soul must not be actively involved in any sort of perception (in the sense

D. Armstrong, The Nature of Mind, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1980, p. 60.
In particular, he thinks, that human beings, when incarnated, are at best rarely aware of their
own thinking in the intelligible world. I discuss this in more detail in Caluori, Plotinus on the Soul, ch. 6.
10
11
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of ‘perception’ specified above). (ii) The thinking of the World Soul, even the
thinking whose intentional object is a sensible world, must not involve any change.
In what follows I will only be concerned with the second task and more
specifically with the task to show that even the World Soul’s thinking whose
intentional object is a sensible world, is unchanging. For reasons that I will
discuss below, I will call the unchanging thinking whose intentional object is a
sensible world, ‘practical thinking’. Before discussing, however, why this sort of
thinking is practical, I first want to discuss why Plotinus thinks it is unchanging
(at least in the case of the World Soul).
2. Reasoning and understanding
If Plotinus believes there to be a sort or form of thinking in the soul that is
unchanging then there are at least two sorts or forms of thinking in the soul
according to Plotinus. For he does not deny that there are processes of reasoning
which certainly involve change. What Plotinus wants to deny, however, is that
such processes occur in the World Soul. At Enn. IV 4, 9, 1-9 Plotinus considers an
objection to his view that Zeus possesses no memory. The opponent claims that,
surely, if Zeus possesses providential foresight (pronoia) of how things come to
be and has authority over the realm of things that are coming to be (ginomena),
then he will have an excellent memory. For, the opponent reasons, Zeus must
know at any moment in time the number of past revolutions of the heavens so
as to devise, compare and reason (logizesthai) what to do in order to exercise the
next step in the process of creation. The opponent seems to assume that Zeus
devises the future of the sensible world with a view to its past and seems to have
in mind a view of craftsmanship according to which a craftsman, in the process
of making his product, has to reason and to have in mind what has been made
up to now in order to know what to do next.
This is certainly an utterly reasonable view of craftsmanship. If you are in the
process of building a house, for example, it is of course important that you know
when the walls are built so that, after the walls are in place, you can start putting
a roof on top. The process of building a house takes place in time and the steps
to be undertaken in order to build the house depend, among other things, on this
temporal order : some things can only be done when other things have already
been done. Importantly, the house builder himself is also in this temporal order
and has to decide what to do next on the basis of what has been done up to now.
In other words, the craftsman himself must also be in time such that the now of
his action is his now or his present.
Plotinus denies that the World Soul needs to reason. He rhetorically asks
at Enn. IV 4, 11, 11-13 : « What reasoning (logismos) or what counting or what
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memory can there be when wisdom (phronêsis) is always present, active,
ruling and providentially arranging things (dioikein) in the same way ? ». What
precisely is meant by wisdom here shall concern us later. For now let us simply
note that wisdom is active. In what follows I will call the activity of wisdom
‘understanding’12. Hence, understanding, thus understood, is an activity and
not merely a capacity ; it must be a form of thinking. Furthermore, it must be
distinct from reasoning. Since Plotinus wants to deny both that there is change
in the World Soul (as is shown by his denial that the World Soul possesses
memory), understanding must be an unchanging activity.
At Enn. IV 4, 12, 5-13 Plotinus further considers the difference between
reasoning and understanding :
« For what else is reasoning than the desire to find wisdom (phronêsis) … ? For
the person reasoning resembles someone who plays the cithara in order to acquire
the art of cithara-playing and the one training in order to acquire a habit and in
general the learner who wants to acquire knowledge. For the person reasoning is
looking to learn what the wise person already possesses. Hence, understanding
(phronein) is in the one who stands still. The reasoning person herself is witness
to this. For as soon as she finds what is necessary, she stops reasoning. And she
has stopped because she has arrived at understanding ».

What precisely is the difference between the activity of reasoning and that
of understanding ? As a first attempt at understanding it, we may be inclined
to call the former, as opposed to the latter, an incomplete activity in Aristotle’
sense : it stops as soon as it has achieved its aim because its aim is outside of
itself. Understanding, by contrast, is complete in the sense that it is not aiming
at anything besides itself but rather has its aim in itself. Thus, we may want to
identify the latter as an instance of what commentators of Aristotle call a complete
actuality or activity (energeia) as opposed to the former, which according to this
model would be an instance of Aristotelian incomplete actuality or activity.
3. Complete and incomplete actuality
Aristotle’s famous distinction between two types of actuality (energeia) can be
found in several of his writings, perhaps most famously at Physics, III, 1-313. At

12
The relation between wisdom and understanding is reflected in the fact that the Greek verb for
understanding (phronein) has the same root as the Greek noun for wisdom (phronêsis).
13
For the following discussion see M. F. Burnyeat, Kinêsis vs. Energeia : A Much-Read Passage
in (but not of) Aristotle’s Metaphysics, « Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy », 34, 2008, pp. 219292 : pp. 259-262.
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Physics, 201b31-33 Aristotle states : « Change (kinêsis) is believed to be an actuality
of a sort (energeia tis), but incomplete ; the reason is that the potential being (to
dunaton), whose actuality it is, is incomplete ». At DA, 417a16-17 Aristotle says
with reference to the Physics-passage : « For change (kinêsis) is an actuality of a
sort but incomplete, as has been said elsewhere ». At DA, 431a6-7 he contrasts
change, which is an actuality only in a qualified way (namely an actuality of what
is incomplete), with actuality unqualifiedly (haplôs), which is of what is complete14.
The difference, as Burnyeat argues, is not one between two species of actuality, a
complete and an incomplete one, but rather « the difference between an energeia
in the full sense of the term and one from which you cannot expect everything you
would normally expect from an energeia »15. Thus, Aristotle distinguishes between
actuality in the full sense from what is actuality only in a qualified and weaker
sense. Keeping this in mind, we may still call them respectively complete actuality
and incomplete actuality, the latter being change, without thereby implying that
they are species of a genus actuality16.
Aristotle, also famously, provides a test for distinguishing between complete and
incomplete actuality (at least) in the case of activities : the present-perfect test17.
We can see that sense perception, for example, is a complete actuality if we can
at the same time truly say that someone sees (or hears) (present) and has seen (or
has heard) (perfect). If we can do so, we can conclude that the actuality of sense
perception is complete. Thus successfully passing the present-perfect test may
be seen as a marker of a complete actuality. Look at an example for incomplete
actuality : Building is incomplete as an actuality because we cannot truly say at
the same time that someone is building (present) and has built (perfect)18. The
focus of this test is on the aspect of the verb, rather than its tense19. That is, the
For further explanations of this distinction see also Met., Q, 8, 1050a23-b2.
Burnyeat, Kinêsis vs. Energeia, p. 264.
16
While many scholars refer to Met., Q, 6, 1048b18-35 to discuss change (kinêsis) and actuality
(energeia), Burnyeat has recently forcefully argued that this famous passage is an intrusion into
Metaphysics, Q and should not be seen as a foundational text for Aristotle’s metaphysical or physical
views : « A more important lesson from this investigation is that present-day scholarship should stop
citing the Passage [i.e. Met., Q, 6, 1048b18-35] as a source of standard Aristotelian doctrine. It is a
freak performance » (Burnyeat, Kinêsis vs. Energeia, p. 276). Whether or not one is convinced by
Burnyeat’s argument, as a matter of prudence, I will not refer to what he calls the Passage for present
purposes. For further discussion see S. Makin, Aristotle Metaphysics Book Q, Clarendon Press, Oxford
2006, pp. 128-154.
17
If, on the basis of Burnyeat’s argument, one is inclined no longer to refer to this test in attempting
to clarify Aristotle’s distinction, one can skip this paragraph. Nothing in what follows depends on it.
18
Examples at Sens., 446b2-6 ; EN, 1174a19-21 ; Met., Q, 8, 1050a23-b2.
19
D. W. Graham, States and Performances : Aristotle’s Test, « Philosophical Quarterly », 30, 1980,
pp. 117-130 ; A. Kosman, Substance, Being, and Energeia, « Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy »,
2, 1984, pp. 121-149 ; Makin, Aristotle Metaphysics Book Q, pp. 148-150.
14
15
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point of the perfect (as used here) is not to say that an activity went on in the
past and is now no longer going on (as we might suppose from using the test in
the case of an incomplete actuality). Rather, by saying that someone has done
something (perfect) we say that the activity is complete and successful.
Going back to Plotinus : can we distinguish between reasoning and
understanding by saying that reasoning is an incomplete actuality (in Aristotle’s
sense) while understanding is complete ? The present-perfect-test seems to give
us the right result (‘right’ with a view to Enn. IV 4, 12, 5-13). I have understood
something whenever I understand it but if I have achieved the aim of reasoning, I
am no longer reasoning. So it may seem that Plotinus uses Aristotle’s distinction
to explain the difference between the activity of reasoning (qua activity) and that
of understanding (qua activity). The problem with this is, however, that Plotinus
criticizes Aristotle’s notion of incomplete actuality. I will now briefly discuss this
critique as developed by Plotinus at Enn. VI 1, 15-22 and then look at Plotinus’
own view on change in the sensible world at Enn. VI 3, 21-26.
At Enn. VI 1, 16 Plotinus criticizes Aristotle’s notion (as he understands it) of
change (kinêsis) as an incomplete actuality (energeia) and aims to show, against
Aristotle, that change and actuality are one and the same20. Plotinus uses an
interpretation of Aristotle’s incomplete actuality that, according to Iamblichus,
goes back to the Stoics21. This is what Simplicius reports :
« And the Stoics do not grasp change in the right way, says Iamblichus, when they
say that ‘incomplete’ is said of change, not because it is not actuality ; for they say
that it is altogether actuality, but because it possesses the ‘again and again’, not
in order to arrive at actuality (for it is this already) but in order to bring about
something distinct which is subsequent to itself »22.

Thus, according to the Stoic understanding of Aristotelian « incomplete
actuality » (an understanding rejected by Iamblichus), actuality is called
‘incomplete’ because it possesses the ‘again and again’ in order to bring about
something distinct, which is subsequent to it. Before discussing what this all
is supposed to mean, let us look at how Plotinus renders the same or at least a
similar point :

20
For a commentary on this passage see C. Natali, La critica di Plotino ai concetti di attualità e
movimento in Aristotele, in C. Natali, S. Maso eds., Anitaristotelismo, Hakkert, Amsterdam 1999, pp.
211-229.
21
Burnyeat, Kinêsis vs. Energeia, p. 284.
22
Simpl., In Cat., p. 307, 1-5 Kalbfleisch.

divine practical thought in plotinus

63

« But if someone said that change is incomplete actuality, nothing would prevent
us from first setting actuality [as a genus] and then to subordinate change, being
incomplete, as a species. For ‘incomplete’ is said of it, not because it is not actuality
— for it is altogether actuality but also possesses the ‘again and again’, not in order
to arrive at actuality — for it is this already — but in order to bring about something
which is distinct, subsequent to itself »23.

The dialectical situation in this passage, as often in Plotinus, is far from
straightforward. However, I take it that Plotinus does not endorse the antecedent
of the first sentence. He denies, as I will try to show, that there are incomplete
activities and therefore does not commit himself to the view that incomplete
actuality is a species of a genus actuality. Accordingly, the rest of the passage
quoted is exegetical — with critical remarks interspersed — without committing
Plotinus to the view on incomplete actuality expressed in it.
Plotinus (mis-)understands Aristotle as postulating the existence of a genus
‘actuality’ with two species : complete and incomplete actuality. Accordingly,
‘incomplete’ would be the differentia that distinguishes the species ‘incomplete
actuality’ from its genus and from the species ‘complete actuality’. Plotinus thus
starts his discussion of Aristotle (as he understands him) with ‘incomplete actuality’
as a species of the genus ‘actuality’. Like the Stoics referred to by Iamblichus,
he argues that actuality in itself is not incomplete but rather complete. If this is
correct, it is already hard to see how the (real or imagined) Aristotelian proponents
of the view discussed in this passage can account for the differentia of the other
species of the genus ‘actuality’, namely of the species ‘complete actuality’.
Let us now look at the differentia of the opponents’ species ‘incomplete
actuality’, namely the differentia ‘incomplete’. How does Plotinus think they
understand it ? I take it that Plotinus uses the expression « possessing the ‘again
and again’ » as an explanation of the differentia ‘incomplete’. This is suggested
by the quotation from Iamblichus above who reports that actuality is said to be
incomplete because it possesses the ‘again and again’.
Unfortunately, it is rather unclear what is meant by ‘again and again’. Aristotle
uses this expression three times in his Physics24. In terms of Plotinus’ source, the
most promising of these seems to be Phys., 220b14 where Aristotle considers in
what sense time is a number. He states that time is the number that is counted
(rather than the number with which we count) and distinguishes the number
(remaining the same) from the things of which it is a number. The number of a
hundred horses is the same as that of a hundred men but the things of which it

23
24

Enn. VI 1, 16, 1-8.
Phys., 220b14 ; 227b17 ; 267b11.
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is the number (horses, men) is different. Aristotle, in the immediately following
lines, states that there may be one and the same (type of) change occurring again
and again and so also the same (type of) time. His examples are a year, spring
and autumn. Although this passage looks promising at first sight, it is not very
helpful for explaining how Plotinus uses the expression ‘again and again’. For
in the Physics-passage Aristotle uses the ‘again and again’ only for one type of
change (namely recurring changes like seasons) and not for change in general
and thus not for change qua incomplete actuality.
Simplicius has also preserved Iamblichus’ remarks on the passage quoted above :
« But how, says Iamblichus, is it possible to say that actuality, the most perfect of
all things, is incomplete ? In what way is it, remaining stable in its being actual,
increased according to the ‘again and again’, like things that proceed according
to number ? »25.

We learn from this passage that change (incomplete actuality) is thought to
increase according to the ‘again and again’. The most plausible way to understand
this increase according to the again and again is, I would suggest, one in time.
The summer recurs again and again, and we can count each occurrence and in
this way count time. Accordingly, Plotinus, summing up his discussion of Enn.
VI 1, 18, describes the position he is examining at Enn. VI 1, 19, 1-3 as one that
identifies incomplete actuality as actuality to which time is added. Moreover,
in his treatise on eternity and time, Enn. III 7, Plotinus dialectically attributes
the ‘again and again’ to change, comparing it to the ‘again and again’ of flowing
water (Enn. III 7, 8, 37-41). The point of the comparison is presumably to show
that his opponents see change as being extended in time26. If this is right then
the definition of ‘incomplete actuality’ under scrutiny in our passage explains the
differentia ‘incomplete’ by the latter’s extension in time.
We are now in a position to see why Plotinus rejects the view that change is
incomplete activity and thus the antecedent of the first sentence of Enn. VI 1, 16
quoted above. Plotinus wants to deny that change can be defined as incomplete
actuality because, in his own view, time is posterior to change, so that time cannot
enter the definition of change. He claims : « And change needs time as little as
what is called ‘actuality’… And if actuality is in timelessness, so also is change
in so far as it is unqualifiedly (haplôs) change »27. Against Aristotle (as Plotinus
understands him) he comes to the conclusion that there are no good grounds for

Simpl., In Cat., p. 307, 6-9 Kalbfleisch.
See Burnyeat, Kinêsis vs. Energeia, p. 283, n. 158.
27
Enn. VI 1, 16, 14-16. See also Enn. VI 3, 22, 43-44.
25
26
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assuming that we can distinguish complete from incomplete actuality as species
of a genus ‘actuality’ : actuality and change are one and the same.
However, it is important to note that Plotinus’ position does not imply that
there is no sense in which we can rightly say of a change that it is extended in time.
His point rather only is that the extension in time is not essential to any kind of
change. If an object is changing then this change-of-the-object will take place in
time because the object is changing from one state to another state. So we must
distinguish, for example, between walking (as a change) and walking a certain
distance. The latter (quantified change) will take time while the former (change
as such) does not28. This is precisely what Plotinus means when he says that what
is incomplete is — not change or activity — but the subject of change. Not change
is brought to completion but that which change changes (Enn. VI 1, 16, 9)29.
4. Change and static activity
Now if Plotinus believes that change and actuality are one and the same then
he will not want to explain the difference between reasoning and understanding
in terms of complete and incomplete actuality. In so far as both are actualities,
it would seem, they are not distinct from one another. Aristotle’s distinction (as
understood by Plotinus) will not help us explain the difference. In order to see
how reasoning and understanding are different as activities, we will have to see
how kinêsis in the intelligible world is different from kinêsis in the sensible world.
Let us first look at the latter, which is discussed at Enn. VI 3, 21-2630. It should
be noted right from the start that Plotinus’ discussion of kinêsis in the sensible
world focuses on change of bodies. So if we want to understand reasoning as a
mental process (that is, a change occurring in the soul), we will also have to see
how this discussion applies to the soul.
Plotinus considers change as one of the highest genera (and thus one of the
categories) of the sensible world. Accordingly, it cannot be defined. To give us
a sketch of the notion of change Plotinus is about to develop in these chapters,
he describes, at the beginning of his discussion, change in outline as the way or
passage (hodos) from a potentiality to that which results from this potentiality
(Enn. VI 3, 22, 3-4). It will be helpful for our purposes to note that change in
28
For extended or quantified change (posê kinêsis) (as opposed to change simpliciter) see Enn. VI
1, 16, 8-13 and E. K. Emilsson, Plotinus on Intellect, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, pp. 34-38.
29
As a critique of Aristotle, this seems to miss the point. For Aristotle explains, as we have seen,
that incomplete actuality is called incomplete because the potential being (to dunaton) whose actuality
it is, is incomplete.
30
For a discussion of kinêsis in Enn. VI 1 and Enn. VI 3 see R. Chiaradonna, Sostanza Movimento
Analogia. Plotino critico di Aristotele, Bibliopolis, Napoli 2002, pp. 147-225.
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the sensible world relies on a potentiality of the thing that is subject to change.
Plotinus gives three examples : (i) A potential statue arrives at a particular form.
The way or passage to arrive at this form is the change of making a statue. (ii)
A potential walker arrives at walking. The way or passage to arrive at walking is
the change that is walking. (iii) A potential dancer arrives at dancing. The way
or passage to arrive at dancing is the change that is dancing.
The difference between (i) on one hand, and (ii) and (iii) on the other is this.
In (i) the change produces something else, i.e. something (namely the statue)
that is not constitutive of the change, whereas neither walking (ii) nor dancing
(iii) have anything « after [them] when the change has stopped » (Enn. VI 3, 22,
12-13)31. Rather, they arrive at what results from them already by an exercise of
the corresponding potentiality. I note in passing that in Aristotle, as understood
by Plotinus, (i) would be an incomplete actuality while (iii) would be a complete
actuality. (ii) may be controversial ; Plotinus criticizes Aristotle, justifiably or not,
for holding that (ii) is incomplete (Enn. VI, 1, 16, 9-14). In any case, for Plotinus
there is only a distinction between activities at the end of which there is a product
distinct from both activity and producer and activities without there being any
such distinct product at the end of the activity. Yet Plotinus’ main point does not
concern this distinction. Rather, even in the former case the things that a change
may produce are not essential to the change and do not complete it. Qua change,
both types of change are the same.
A further feature of change in the sensible world is important for our purposes :
what all changes in the sensible world have in common is that the thing that is
undergoing change, in so far as it is undergoing change, is not at rest. That is, the
subject of change is no longer in the same state as it was before it was changing :
« But what is common [to all species of change] ? That each thing is not in the
same [state] in which it was previously and that it is neither standing still nor at
complete rest but, in so far as change is present, it possesses a direction towards
something else… »32.

For there to be a change in the sensible world, thus, there must be a subject to
change. This subject must be in two states that are ordered as prior and posterior.
If change occurs, then the subject ceases to be in the prior state and is going to
be in the posterior state ; it does not stand still in so far as change is present. In
so far as a thing stands still, it is not changing and in so far as it is changing, it

Note how Plotinus carefully does not claim that the thing produced is the aim or telos of the
change.
32
Enn. VI 3, 22, 35-40.
31
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does not stand still. Thus, a crucial feature of the sensible world is this : kinêsis
and stasis exclude one another : « And change in objects in the sensible world [peri
ta aisthêta], sent in from something else, shakes, drives, wakes up, and pushes
the things being changed by it so that they do not sleep and do not remain in
sameness… » (Enn. VI 3, 23, 1-4).
Now Plotinus thinks that souls, being immaterial entities, are quite distinct
from bodies. So we may wonder whether we can use change in bodies as a model
to explain change in the soul at all or whether changes that occur in souls are
rather fundamentally different from changes in bodies. One important difference
is certainly this : according to Plotinus there cannot be any mental activity that
would count as an affection of the soul in the sense that the soul, through such
an affection, would be subject to an alteration. In the case of bodies, by contrast,
such alterations are clearly possible and regularly occur in fact. Let us briefly
look at sense perception as an example to illustrate this.
At Enn. III 6, 1-4 Plotinus states :
« We said that sense perceptions are not affections but activities and judgments
concerning affections ; affections belong to something else, for instance to the
qualified body, while the judgment belongs to the soul because the judgment is
not an affection... ».

Plotinus calls sense perception a judgment (krisis) in this passage and insists
that the soul is not affected when perceiving. He also states that the thing that is
affected by perception is a body. As Emilsson has shown, the judgment mentioned
in this passage possesses (like in Alexander of Aphrodisias) the same function
as assent possesses in Stoic epistemology : it is an assent to an impression or
presentation33. In the same context, still discussing sense perception, Plotinus
states : « the activity [of sense perception] is not an alteration but it [i.e. the soul]
simultaneously approaches what it possesses » (Enn. III 6, 2, 35f.). The soul
« approaches what it possesses » in the sense that, when perceiving, it does so by
means of innate concepts. So perception in the soul is crucially the activation
of concepts that the soul already possesses and thus it is an actualization of a
capacity. Having clarified this, we may still call mental activities (such as that of
sense perception) affections as long as we distinguish them from affections that
are alterations. In doing so we may refer to Aristotle who, in DA, II, 5, distinguishes
two uses of the term ‘affection’ : In one use, ‘affection’ refers to the actualization
of a potentiality and Aristotle insists that this actualization is not an alteration.
This notion of affection is available to Plotinus, too, when he discusses affections

33

E. K. Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, ch. 7.
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of the soul. Of course, in Plotinus, the actualization occurs in the soul rather than
in a hylemorphic whole of which the soul is thought only to be the constitutive
form (as opposed to a separate substance). Yet this does not imply that Plotinus
cannot consider some kinds of mental activities as affections in the sense of
actualizations of potentialities.
What is reasoning ? Like sense perception, reasoning is a mental process. It
is based on presentations and consists in analyzing them and relating them to
one another : « For perception is reception of a form or of an affection of a body
and reasoning and opinion are based on perception » (Enn. I 1, 2, 26f.). We receive
further details in another passage :
« That which reasons in it [i.e. in the soul], in combining and dividing, makes its
judgment about the presentations that are available to it as derived from sense
perception ; and, as for the things which come to it from the thinking part, it
observes what one might call their impressions, and has the same capacity also in
dealing with these... »34.

Thus, both sense perception and reasoning are mental processes occurring
in the soul. When perceiving and when reasoning, the soul changes from one
state to another, distinct, state. Now for many mental processes that occur in a
temporal order it is fairly clear that they cannot occur at the same time and that
they must be temporally ordered. Sense perception, for example, often depends
on sensory objects in the sensible world in such a way that, while these objects are
changing, the soul perceiving them is too35. However, it is far less clear whether
we can generalize this and claim that, for every mental process, its various stages
cannot occur at the same time (even though, of course, they do not occur at the
same time as a matter of fact if they are stages of a mental process). So why is it
in the case of reasoning that the different stages of the reasoning process do not
occur at the same time ? Plotinus seems to think that the fact that it is a process
is explained through a certain weakness of the reasoning subject (namely a lack
of understanding). So perhaps the fact that the different stages of a reasoning
process occur in a temporal order is not grounded in a state of affairs according
to which the object of thought possesses incompatible parts that could not be
thought at the same time in the same soul. Rather mental processes occur (and
are extended in time) due to limitations of the reasoning subject.

34
Enn. V 3, 2, 7-13. The thinking part here is not the reasoning faculty but rather the part of the
soul that eternally remains in the intelligible realm.
35
Again, the sort of change may well be quite different : the body being perceived is altered while
the soul perceiving it actualizes different concepts at different times.
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However that may be, I hope these explanations of mental processes are
sufficient to show that we can use change of bodies as a model to explain mental
change even though at least many changes in bodies are alterations — a sort of
change we do not find in souls. Both change in body and in soul are transitions
from one state to another ; both possess a subject of change, namely a body or a
soul respectively. While it is true that bodies are quite distinct from souls, change
in both cases relies on potentialities of a subject that get actualized through
change. Finally, in both cases, while and in so far as change is present to the
subject, rest is absent from it.
Before turning to kinêsis in the intelligible world, a note on translation. Up to
now I have translated kinêsis as change. Both for Aristotle and for Plotinus’ notion
of kinêsis in the sensible world this is, I think, an adequate translation. However,
in what follows I wish to turn to Plotinus’ view of kinêsis in the intelligible world.
We will see that ‘change’ would not be a good translation there. Instead, I will
translate ‘kinêsis’ as ‘activity’ if the word refers to kinêsis in the intelligible world.
Plotinus argues that the highest genera (or categories) of the intelligible world
are the five highest genera of Plato’s Sophist : kinêsis, stasis, being, sameness and
difference. These genera are not exclusive : every item (at least every item that
is not a highest genus) in the intelligible world participates in all five genera. At
Enn. VI 2, 7 Plotinus discusses activity (kinêsis) as one of the highest genera and
he considers this the genus of all life. The reason for emphasizing life is, I think,
that Plotinus identifies the intelligible world with the Timaean Living Being.
Accordingly, everything in the intelligible world is alive. That is, everything in
the intelligible world is active and belongs to the corresponding highest genus
of kinêsis. Now even though there is activity in the intelligible world, there is
no change. Everything in the intelligible world remains always the same. That
is, everything also participates in the highest genus of stasis. Thus, kinêsis and
stasis in the intelligible world do not exclude one another. Rather everything in
the intelligible world participates not only in being but also in activity and stasis :
« Hence, all things are being, activity and stasis ; these are all-pervading genera,
and each thing [in the intelligible world] that is posterior [to the highest genera]
is a being, a stasis and an activity » (Enn. VI 2, 8, 25-27). A paradigm of static
activity is intellectual contemplation which consists in an unchanging active state
of understanding reality.
5. The practical thinking of the World Soul
I hope that these considerations have already indicated how we must distinguish
between reasoning and understanding. Understanding is an activity that is static.
It does not belong to the sensible world but rather to the intelligible world. By
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contrast, reasoning is a form of change ; it is not static. As long as one is reasoning
and in so far as one is reasoning, one does not stand still. Earlier I quoted the
following passage :
« For the person reasoning is looking to learn what the wise person already possesses.
Hence, understanding (phronein) is in the one who stands still. The reasoning
person herself is witness to this. For as soon as she finds what is necessary, she
stops reasoning. And she has stopped because she has arrived at understanding »36.

Plotinus here explicitly claims that the person who possesses understanding
stands still. The passage does not tell us whether the understanding of the wise
person is a static activity or simply a disposition. However, in the case of the World
Soul the case is clear. For the World Soul, possessing understanding, stands still in
its cognitive activity37. Its understanding is neither a change in the sensible world
nor an inactive state. It rather is an unchanging activity in the intelligible world.
What sort of understanding is it ? As I stated initially, this paper focuses on
the World Soul’s practical thinking and not on its theoretical contemplation of
the world of Forms. I now wish to show what I mean by ‘practical thinking’ and
in particular that it is indeed unchanging according to Plotinus.
When discussing change in the sensible world, I claimed that change
presupposes the subject of change to be in different states that are ordered : for
every change (and for every stage of a change), there is a prior and a posterior
state of the subject of change38. The sensible world as a whole is also subject to
change. Thus, the sensible world as a whole, in so far as it is changing, must also
be ordered according to prior and posterior. We may call this the temporal order
of the sensible world. At Enn. III 7, 11, 35-40 Plotinus claims that, while in the
intelligible world everything is together, in the sensible world one thing occurs
after another. This presupposes that the latter possesses a temporal structure
that allows things to occur at different times respectively, prior and posterior.
Establishing this order presupposes rationality, according to Plotinus. It matters
greatly in what order things occur. After all, the sensible world is to be an excellent
image of the world of Forms. The way in which the sensible world is organized is
through providence. This is what Plotinus claims at Enn. III 3, 2, 6-11 :
« The all [i.e. the sensible world] is ordered by a general-like providence (stratêgikê
pronoia) which sees the actions and experiences and what must be ready, food and

Enn. IV 4, 12, 5-13.
See the quotation from Enn. IV 4, 11, 11-13 above.
38
I take Plotinus to refer to Aristotle’s notion of prior and posterior in the latter’s discussion of
time and change. See Phys., 219a20-21.
36
37
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drink and not least all the weapons and war engines ; everything that occurs as a
consequence of their being interwoven is foreseen, so that the result possesses room
to be well ordered ; and everything comes in a well-planned way from the general... ».

The sensible world, thus, is providentially arranged : everything in it « is
foreseen ». Moreover, everything is organized in a well-planned manner. We
have already encountered this idea earlier when Plotinus attributed to Zeus
providential foresight.
Here is another passage confirming that the rational order of the sensible
world is due to divine providence. At Enn. IV 4, 39, 11-17 Plotinus compares the
rationality (logos) that governs the world to the rationality that governs a state :
« But perhaps the rationality of the world is better compared to the rationality that
establishes the order and law of a state — a rationality that already includes the
knowledge of what the citizens are going to do and by account of what they are
going to do it ; with a view to all of this, it legislates and weaves together by means
of laws everything they experience and do and the honors and dishonors of their
actions in such a manner that everything [in the state] happens as if it had been
brought into harmony spontaneously »39.

Further evidence can be found in his two treatises on providence (Enn. III 1
and Enn. III 2-3)40.
The view that providence is or presupposes knowledge of the future and that
the World Soul possesses this sort of knowledge can also be found in our passage.
Plotinus makes it clear that the providential arrangement (dioikêsis) of the sensible
world presupposes understanding. At Enn. IV 4, 12, 18-22 Plotinus attributes more
specifically knowledge of future events to the World Soul : « Moreover, if it also
knows the future (ta mellonta) — it would be absurd to say that it does not — how
will it not also know how they will turn out ? But if it also knows how they will turn
out, why would it still need to reason and to compare the past to the present ? ».
Thus, the World Soul knows the future of what it is sempiternally producing.

39
Interestingly, this passage claims that the sensible world is ordered by means of laws. This
idea goes back (at least) to later Stoics, such as Seneca, who also believe that the government of the
sensible world is accomplished by a law that they call the law of nature. It is important to note that
this law of nature accounts not only for the factual order of the world but also, normatively, for its
goodness : due to Fate the factual and the normative order coincide (Seneca, Prov., 5.6f.). This does
neither in Stoicism nor in Plotinus imply that providence does not care for everything down to the
smallest detail. In any case, as his comparison with the state shows, Plotinus does not believe in
such an implication.
40
See also E. Song, Aufstieg und Abstieg der Seele. Diesseitigkeit und Jenseitigkeit in Plotins Ethik
der Sorge, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2009, and Caluori, Plotinus on the Soul, ch. 2.
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In the same passage, Plotinus insists that the knowledge of the future that
the World Soul possesses is not the sort of knowledge of the future that a diviner
possesses. What is the difference ? One difference is that the World Soul’s wisdom,
as opposed to the diviner’s knowledge, is productive41. Another difference is this :
Divination works on the basis of signs that are present to the diviner and on the
basis of which the diviner predicts future events. A distinction between present
and future, a temporal distinction, is thus a crucial element of the art of divination.
Moreover, the diviner herself is in time, now predicting events that are to occur
later relative to the diviner’s present. The wisdom of the World Soul, however,
is different : « The wisdom about the future and that about the present are the
same through standing still » (Enn. IV 4, 26-28).
These claims lead to at least two problems. First, if the sensible world, in all
its complexity, is arranged by divine providence and if the World Soul knows how
to arrange the sensible world in such a way as to include everything down to the
smallest detail — how can the understanding of this arrangement be unchanging ?
How could it possibly know what to do when if its thinking is unchanging ? I
claimed above that it is crucial for the ordinary craftsman himself to be in time
so that he knows when the walls are to be ready so as to put a roof on top. Note
that he must not only know that they are ready on Wednesday, for example, but
rather also when Wednesday is in relation to his present (that it is the day after
tomorrow, for example). If the cognitive activity of the builder of the house was
exclusively unchanging, he would be outside of the temporal order : how could
he possibly know that now this or that must be done ? If he was outside of the
temporal order, there would be no now, no present, to him.
Second, one may wonder whether the World Soul’s thinking should not rather
be called ‘productive’ (as opposed to practical) thinking, because, one may think,
the aim or telos of its thinking is, after all, the sensible world that it produces.
And, one may think, practical thinking is not productive. Let us consider the
second question first. The distinction between practical, non-productive action
and productive action I have in mind here is Aristotle’s. At EN, 1140b6-7 he
states : « For while producing has an end other than itself, this cannot be the case
for action. For the action’s being good (eupraxia) is itself its end ». Accordingly,
Aristotle also distinguishes between practical wisdom and craft in that the

41
Galen, in his On Prognosis, discusses the difference between medicine and divination. This is
important to him because both medical prognosis and divination are about the future. Both arts rely
on signs. However, he points out that one crucial difference is that medicine, as opposed divination,
is productive. See P. Van Nuffelen, Galen, Divination and the Status of Medicine, « The Classical
Quarterly », 64, 2014, pp. 337-352.
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former is concerned with non-productive action while crafts are concerned with
production (EN, 1140b1-6)42.
Our discussion so far has shown that Plotinus crucially does not distinguish
the sort of actuality that building a house is, for example, from the sort of actuality
that dancing is ; they are actualities of the same sort. They are both complete
also in the sense that neither has its goal or telos outside of itself. But if so, then
Plotinus will not accept Aristotle’s distinction between practical wisdom and craft
(technê) either. Now if this is right then Plotinus will have to explain the following
consequence. If the World Soul’s thinking whose intentional object is a sensible
world (the thinking I call ‘practical’) does not possess a goal outside of itself then
the aim (telos) of the creation and maintenance of the sensible world (which is
the exercise of a craft) is not the sensible world. For if the sensible world was the
aim of the World Soul’s productive thinking, the World Soul’s productive thinking
would « have an end other than itself ».
Now in our passage, Enn. IV 4, 11-12, Plotinus explicitly calls the World Soul a
producer and compares its activity to that of a perfect (and wise) craftsman. But
how is it possible that productive activity (and thus also productive thinking) has
its aim in itself and not in the product it produces ? In an earlier paper I argued
that Plotinus found a solution to this problem in Stoicism43. According to the
second telos-formula of Antipater the goal of life consists in « doing everything in
one’s power, constantly and unwaveringly, to obtain the primary natural things »
(SVF III, p. 253.3-7)44. Now what the Stoics think crucial is that one does this, not
in order to obtain the primary natural things, but rather in order to do everything
in one’s power to obtain them. The Stoics illustrate this with the example of the
archer who does everything in his power to hit the mark — not in order to hit
the mark but rather in order to do everything in his power to hit the mark (Cic.,
Fin., III 22). In other words, what the Stoic archer is really after is exercising his
art skillfully. Whether or not he hits the mark is indifferent to him45. It is in this
sense not his (external) aim to hit the mark.

For Aristotle’s distinction see V. Politis, Aristotle’s Advocacy of Non-productive Action, « Ancient
Philosophy », 18, 1998, pp. 353-279.
43
D. Caluori, The essential functions of a Plotinian soul, « Rhizai », 2, 2005, pp. 75-93. Note that the
Stoics, as opposed to Aristotle, considered the good life to be based on a craft (the technê tou biou).
44
Primary natural things are things that, according to the Stoics, are not good but rather indifferent.
Yet they do have value and are thus preferred indifferents.
45
For the Stoics on this point see G. Striker, Antipater, or the art of living, in Ead. ed., Essays on
Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996, pp. 298-315. There
is dispute as to whether it is completely irrelevant, according to the Stoics, or only qualifiedly so (for
the goodness of the person’s life). I remain neutral on the question of interpretation of the Stoics but
I suggest that Plotinus understood the Stoic point in the unqualified sense.
42
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In analogy, the aim of the thinking of the Plotinian World Soul about the
creation and maintenance of a sensible world (and of the ensuing activity which
leads to the creation and maintenance of the sensible world) is not the sensible
world (as an external product). The World Soul rather aims at thinking properly
about the creation and maintenance of a sensible world. In other words, the
World Soul, being a supremely rational being, aims at exercising its practical
rationality skillfully and perfectly. Hence, the practical thinking of the World
Soul possesses its aim in itself. There is thus no essential difference between
non-productive practical thinking and productive thinking (‘thinking’ in the sense
of understanding).
The fact that the World Soul’s practical aim exclusively consists in thinking
properly about the creation and maintenance of a sensible world does not imply
that it is not motivated to create and maintain the sensible world. Rather, its
rational motivation to do so belongs to the exercise of its rationality. Plotinus states
at Enn. IV 4, 12, 43-47 : « But in works which one masters alone, what else would
someone need than himself and his will (boulêsis) ? But this is the same as his
wisdom. Thus, someone like that does not need anything else for production… ».
The proper practical thinking whose intentional object is a sensible world has as
a consequence the creation and maintenance of a sensible world46.
This leads us to the first question asked above. Given the enormous complexity
of the sensible world, how is it possible for the World Soul, by unchangingly
thinking about the order of a sensible world, to act in it so as to make it an
excellent image of the world of Forms ? Now if the World Soul’s activity in the
sensible world itself varies so that it depends on when the World Soul does what
then it is indeed hard to see how the World Soul should be able to do so without
being subject to change. Doing different things at different times, the later things
depending on earlier achievements, presupposes that one is aware of when to do
what. Moreover, one has to be aware of it at the right time. In other words, the agent
herself must also be in the temporal order in which she acts. In such cases, there
will be a now at which the agent does something that she has not done before.
However, if my activity is uniformly and regularly the same then I am able to
be engaged in this activity without ever directing my attention to it (assuming that
no one will ever interfere ; that I will be able to do it without effort and without
46
For how this works see D. Caluori, Reason and Necessity : The Descent of the Philosopher Kings,
« Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy », 40, 2011, pp. 7-27. Explaining this from the point of view of
Plotinus’ distinction of internal and external activity see C. Rutten, La doctrine des deux actes dans la
philosophie de Plotin, « Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’étranger », 146, 1956, pp. 100-106 ;
A. C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990, pp. 98-107 ; D. O’Meara,
Plotinus. An Introduction to the Enneads, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1993, chs. 6-7 ; and Emilsson,
Plotinus on Sense-Perception, ch. 1f.
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getting tired etc.). I do not need to know that now I have to do this or that in
particular if what I do now is no different from what I did before or what I will do
later. In other words, I can exercise a uniform and regular activity without there
being a now at which I have to do this or that in particular. For if my activity
always remains exactly the same then, as far as this activity is concerned, it is
not necessary to make temporal distinctions. If so, it is not necessary to assume
that an agent engaged in such a uniform and regular activity is herself in time.
It seems to me that we can indeed attribute to the World Soul such a uniform
and regular activity. At Enn. IV 8, 2, 28 Plotinus claims that the World Soul rules
the sensible world by means of an effortless command47. What is this effortless
command ? In order to understand what Plotinus means here, it is worthwhile to
look at a passage in the pseudo-Aristotelian De Mundo48. There are so many textual
similarities between Enn. IV 8 and De Mundo that it seems clear that Plotinus
knew either De Mundo or a text dependent on it (or on which it depended). I
suggest that De Mundo helps us understand the World Soul’s effortless command.
The author of De Mundo explains how God rules the sensible world as follows :
« by means of a simple revolution of the whole heaven completed in a night and a
day, the various motions of all the heavenly bodies are initiated » (Mu., 399a1-6).
Now the Plotinian World Soul, just like De Mundo’s God, commands all the stars
to move in such a way as to establish the cosmic order of the sensible world. The
World Soul does so by means of a simple revolution of the whole heaven. The
World Soul’s own immediate activity in the sensible world is, if this interpretation
is correct, the movement of the sphere of the fixed stars. It is a regular and
uniform activity that will never be in need of the World Soul’s attention. In order
to be active in this way, the World Soul does not need to be in time. Rather, it
sempiternally keeps the sphere of the fixed stars at the same speed on the same
path. Of course, it does so knowing that by doing so it will make sure that the
whole sensible world (and not just the outermost sphere) is an excellent image
of the world of Forms.
Perhaps this explanation of the World Soul’s activity does not appear satisfactory
because Plotinus in many passages clearly holds that the World Soul is active
throughout the sensible world, being thus active in various ways which go far
beyond the movement of the outermost sphere (for example at Enn. IV 3, 22). So

See also Enn. IV 8, 2, 16.
For a comparison see C. Tornau, Plotin. Enneaden VI 4-5 [22-23]. Ein Kommentar, Teubner,
Stuttgart - Leipzig 1998, pp. 66-68. Tornau discusses a difference between the Ps. Aristotle and Plotinus
according to which Ps. Aristotle locates God in space while Plotinus does not. I do not think that this
difference affects the point I am making in this paper.
47
48
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how can the World Soul be active in the whole sensible world if what I argued
above is true ? Again, De Mundo can help :
« For God is truly the preserver of everything and the creator of whatever is completed
in this world without, however, taking upon himself the toil of a self-working and
laborious living being. Instead, he uses an indefatigable power by means of which
he prevails even over what appears remote »49.

The author of De Mundo identifies as a mistake the view of his opponents that
what God’s divine power does is the immediate work of God. In the following
lines, he compares God to the Persian Great King who, although being the king of
a huge empire and thus arranging everything in it, did not even have to leave his
palace in order to do so. Instead, he remained there, using his power to arrange
things in his realm. What holds true of the Great King, our author claims, also
applies to God : « it is more honorable, more becoming for him to reside in the
highest place, while his power, penetrating the whole cosmos, moves sun and
moon and turns the whole heaven and is the cause of the preservation for the
things upon Earth » (Mu., 398b6-10). These considerations solve our problem if
we assume that the activity of the World Soul’s power (the power penetrating
the whole sensible world) is not an immediate activity of the World Soul. And,
indeed, there is no reason to insist that the World Soul is immediately active in
the sensible world other than by moving the outermost sphere.
For here is an alternative : apart from the movement of the outermost sphere,
the World Soul’s power in the sensible world is exercised — not immediately
by the World Soul — but by other agents working on behalf of the World Soul.
Consider again the Great King of Persia :
« the King himself, it is said, lived in Susa or Ecbatana, invisible to everyone,
in a marvelous palace... Outside [the walls of the palace] the leaders and most
distinguished men were drawn up in order, some as personal bodyguards and
attendants to the King himself, some as guardians of each outer wall... and others
— each responsible for taking care of a particular task, as they were necessary »50.

If the generals of the Great King fight and win a battle then the Great King
has fought and won a battle. He is able to do so without ever leaving Susa or
Ecbatana because his power is exercised by agents working in his name and on
his behalf. Similarly, the work of the Plotinian World Soul in the sensible world

Mu., 397b20-24. Plotinus denies that the World Soul is self-working (autourgos) at Enn. IV 8,
2, 26-30, using the same expression as Ps. Aristotle.
50
Mu., 398a13-26.
49
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is for the most part exercised by agents of the World Soul, most prominently by
the stars who exercise the power of the World Soul and thus contribute, each
according to its own function, to the order and excellence of the sensible world51.
6. Conclusion
I referred above to Enn. IV 4, 10 where Plotinus, focusing his discussion on
the World Soul, sets aside the Craftsman by saying : « as far as the Craftsman is
concerned, we must completely eliminate ‘earlier and later’ (to prosô kai opisô)
by attributing to him a single unchangeable (atrepton) and timeless (achronon)
life » (Enn. IV 4, 10, 4-6). I have argued that such an unchangeable and timeless
life is also to be attributed to the World Soul even though part of its life consists
in practical thinking. Given the results presented in this paper, nothing seems
to hinder attributing the same sort of thinking also to the Craftsman himself if
we find a way to distinguish between the Craftsman and the World Soul — a
distinction on which Plotinus insists52.
51
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For more details see Caluori, Plotinus on the Soul, ch. 5.
For an attempt at doing so see Caluori, Plotinus on the Soul, chs. 3 and 5.
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